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Background: Ineffective decision making is a major source of everyday functional impairment and reduced quality of
life for young people with mental disorders. However, very little is known about what distinguishes decision making
by individuals with different disorders or the neuropsychological processes or brain systems underlying these. This is
the focus of the current review. Scope and methodology: We first propose a neuroeconomic model of the decision-
making process with separate stages for the prechoice evaluation of expected utility of future options; choice
execution and postchoice management; the appraisal of outcome against expectation; and the updating of value
estimates to guide future decisions. According to the proposed model, decision making is mediated by neuropsy-
chological processes operating within three domains: (a) self-referential processes involved in autobiographical
reflection on past, and prospection about future, experiences; (b) executive functions, such as working memory,
inhibition, and planning, that regulate the implementation of decisions; and (c) processes involved in value
estimation and outcome appraisal and learning. These processes are underpinned by the interplay of multiple brain
networks, especially medial and lateralized cortical components of the default mode network, dorsal corticostriatal
circuits underpinning higher order cognitive and behavioral control, and ventral frontostriatal circuits, connecting to
brain regions implicated in emotion processing, that control valuation and learning processes. Findings and
conclusion: Based on clinical insights and considering each of the decision-making stages in turn, we outline
disorder-specific hypotheses about impaired decision making in four childhood disorders: attention-deficit/
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), conduct disorder (CD), depression, and anxiety. We hypothesize that decision
making in ADHD is deficient (i.e. inefficient, insufficiently reflective, and inconsistent) and impulsive (biased toward
immediate over delayed alternatives). In CD, it is reckless and insensitive to negative consequences. In depression, it
is disengaged, perseverative, and pessimistic, while in anxiety, it is hesitant, risk-averse, and self-deprecating.
A survey of current empirical indications related to these disorder-specific hypotheses highlights the limited and
fragmentary nature of the evidence base and illustrates the need for a major research initiative in decision making in
childhood disorders. The final section highlights a number of important additional general themes that need to be
considered in future research. Keywords: Transdiagnostic; decision making; reinforcement learning; delayed
reinforcement; executive functions; working memory; inhibition; prefrontal cortex; ventral striatum; amygdala: CD;
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder; anxiety; depression.
Introduction
Success or failure in life is partly determined by the
decisions one makes. In this review, we argue that
ineffective decision making contributes to impaired
functioning and reduced life satisfaction in children
and adolescents with mental health conditions.
These individuals’ propensity to make poor deci-
sions, while strikingly apparent to clinicians and
other professionals, is underresearched. Little is
known about the neuropsychological mechanisms
that underpin decision-making deficits in child and
adolescent mental disorders, and crucially, there
has been no systematic attempt to understand how
these processes and mechanisms might differ
between disorders.
In this review, we adopt a neuroeconomic perspec-
tive on decision making to address these issues. This
approach provides an alternative framework to tra-
ditional psychiatric models (Hasler, 2012; Kishida,
King-Casas, & Montague, 2010) and potentially
offers new insights into the ways in which complex
behavioral processes are compromised in those with
mental disorders. From our perspective, the deci-
sion-making process can be broken down into a
number of stages. For instance, whether a teenage
patient has the motivation to attend her school-
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mate’s party depends on her evaluation of whether
she will derive pleasure from doing so (‘evaluation of
the subjective utility of a future event’, in neuroeco-
nomic language). This is distinct from implementing
the decision to act – how she will go about organizing
herself and her environment so she is able to attend
the party. These two processes are also distinct from
her appraisal of the outcome – whether or not her
experiences of the party were positive, neutral, or
negative, and how that altered her views of herself
and the value she attributes to such social encoun-
ters. The different stages of decision making will be
associated with different expressions of psycho-
pathology: a depressed teenager may find it hard to
motivate herself to go to the party, whereas someone
with ADHD may find it hard to generate and follow
through a plan to get there. In contrast, a person
with anxiety might attend the party but spend most
of it scrutinizing their own actions and worrying
about how they are perceived by others.
It is important to note that such a neuroeconomic
approach to decision-making rests on the core
assumption that each action an individual performs
is in some sense a choice – whether or not it is
recognized as such by the individual (Sonuga-Barke
& Fairchild, 2012). In the party example, even an
unmotivated and disengaged or an anxious-avoidant
response to the invitation to the party reflects a
choice. Another assumption is that each individual,
including those with mental disorders, sets out to
maximize subjective value or utility through their
actions – whether or not that goal is actually
achieved. It is important to understand here that
maximizing subjective utility does not necessarily
imply maximizing the actual benefits available to a
person. In fact, using the example above, a decision
not to attend a party can be seen as rational from an
anxious adolescent’s perspective given the negative
utility they attach to incurring social embarrass-
ment, but when viewed more objectively, this deci-
sion may be damaging at a number of levels (i.e.
reduced social interaction and ability to develop
coping strategies and exacerbation of anxiety due to
avoidance).
Leaving aside the issue of mental health-related
differences in economic goals, there are also barriers
to effective decision making that are associated with
impairments at different stages of the decision-
making process: Even if an individual has the same
goals, they may differ from other individuals in their
ability to make and carry through decisions to
achieve those goals. In this sense, effective choice
depends on the individual’s ability to compare the
subjective utility that may be derived in the future
from the different choice options available (Oppen-
heimer & Kelso, 2015). These options may differ in
terms of their valence (gains or losses), timing
(immediate or delayed outcomes), and risk/proba-
bility (likely or unlikely). Furthermore, decision
making is informed by both state- and trait-like
characteristics. Instances of state-level differences
are (a) intrinsic intraindividual variations in motiva-
tional states linked to physiological drives and
energetic factors (e.g. hunger, thirst, need for sleep;
de Ridder, Kroese, Adriaanse, and Evers 2014); and
(b) extrinsic variations in elements such as the
quality and availability of information about alter-
native actions and their consequences (Newell &
Shanks, 2014) or external pressure (Byrne, Silasi-
Mansat, & Worthy, 2015; Stringaris, 2015). Return-
ing to the example given above, fatigue would be an
intrinsic state factor, while knowledge about who
might be at the party would be an extrinsic one. At
the trait level, individuals vary from one another in
(a) their hierarchy of tastes and preferences with
regard to different choice outcomes (a factor related
to variations in subjective value assignment; Plass-
mann, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2010); and (b) the
efficiency with which they can process choice-related
information and implement their decisions.
In the current review, the complexity and the
multifaceted nature of putative decision-making
deficits in mental disorders will be explored by
contrasting aspects of the neuropsychology and
pathophysiology of four mental disorders affecting
children and adolescents: depression, anxiety,
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),
and conduct disorder (CD). Such transdiagnostic
comparisons are timely given the growing emphasis
on identifying core dimensions of pathophysiological
impairment that are relevant across different clinical
presentations. This perspective, although not new,
is currently being promoted by the National Institute
for Mental Health (NIMH) through their Research
Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative (Insel et al., 2010).
The aim of RDoC is to shift the focus of research,
and eventually clinical practice, away from existing
diagnostic categories, as recently updated in the
DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013),
toward ‘new ways of classifying psychopathology
based on dimensions of observable behavior and
neurobiological measures.’ The objective is to ‘define
basic dimensions of functioning … cutting across
disorders as traditionally defined’ (NIMH, http://
www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/index.
shtml; Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). The RDoC emphasis
on transdiagnostic approaches represents a positive
move to refocus a scientific field increasingly frag-
mented into diagnostic specialisms. However, there is
considerable debate about themerits of this approach
(Peterson, 2015). In light of this imperative, we are
particularly interested to see whether potentially
diverse patterns of decision-making impairment
across mental disorders implicate similar neuropsy-
chological and neurobiological systems.
We chose to focus on ADHD, CD, anxiety, and
depression because (a) each is relatively common in
childhood and adolescence (Polanczyk, Salum,
Sugaya, Caye, & Rohde, 2015); (b) they frequently
co-occur (Kessler et al., 2005); and (c) they
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encompass a broad range of psychopathological
dimensions, both internalizing and externalizing; in
this latter sense, they provide a strong test of the
value of transdiagnostic approaches. It is also
important to note that clinical observation and
laboratory-based experimental research combine to
suggest that problems with decision making are
present in each disorder. Clinically, core features of
the four disorders implicate decision-making impair-
ments. Individuals with ADHD are often described as
disinhibited and impulsive – choosing without suffi-
cient reflection and favoring immediacy over delayed
outcomes. CD is linked with risk-taking and failure
to learn from negative consequences. In contrast,
anxious individuals tend to be oversensitive to risk of
negative outcomes, while individuals with depres-
sion may be characterized as generally unmotivated
and indecisive. It is important to note that despite
the accepted complexity and heterogeneity of each of
the disorders and the related existence of different
types and subtypes within current diagnostic man-
uals, we feel that the purposes of our analysis are, at
this stage, best served by adopting generic (e.g.
depression and anxiety) rather than diagnostic-
system-specific terms and considering the archety-
pal features of each condition in a general way.
The remainder of the article will be divided up
into three sections. In the first, we will introduce a
unified model of economic decision making we have
developed to help both organize the empirical
evidence relating to the putative sources of impair-
ment in different mental disorders and provide a
framework for the development of hypotheses
regarding the underlying neuropsychological and
neurobiological mechanisms. In the second part,
we will apply the model to the four disorders – first
setting up differential hypotheses about the role of
different stages in decision-making, neuropsycho-
logical processes, and neural systems in each
disorder, and then selectively surveying the extant
empirical evidence in light of these hypotheses. We
conclude by identifying issues that merit further
investigation.
An integrated neuroeconomic model of
decision making
Figure 1 illustrates the core features of our inte-
grated decision-making model and highlights the
complex interplay underpinning neuropsychological
systems (see also Kalueff, Stewart, Song, and Gottes-
man, 2015). The model has several general charac-
teristics.
Neuropsychological decision-making stages
The decision-making process itself is divided into
three distinct stages: (a) evaluation, (b) decision and
management, and (c) appraisal and accommodation.
Evaluation. This stage involves processes whereby
subjective utility estimates are generated for each
potential outcome. This involves the integration of
information related to parameters, such as valence
(win or lose), magnitude (large or small), timing (now
or later), and probability (likely or unlikely) – for each
possible option. This provides a subjective estimate
of the cost/benefit and timing of each outcome. We
assume that this is influenced by both the implicit
value system of an individual and explicit thought
processes. The implicit value system – which we refer
to as the utility matrix – involves personal preference
about content (if an individual prefers apples to
oranges, apples will be assigned a higher utility than
oranges in the matrix) but also timing (whether a
person dislikes risk or delay) of outcomes. Τhe utility
matrix is not considered a fixed element, but is
automatically updated in the light of the evaluation
of the consequences of decisions. The explicit value
system involves self-referential autobiographical
processes allowing reflection on the experience of
prior choices and envisaging potential outcomes.
Although the specific weighting of the influences of
implicit and explicit processes is not specified in the
model, it is assumed that abnormalities in either set
of processes could disrupt outcome appraisal or
influence evaluation processes in those with mental
disorders.
Decision and management. This stage involves
comparisons of the subjective utility estimates of
the available alternatives, the choice of one option
over the other, and the implementation of a plan to
ensure that the chosen option is enacted effectively.
We assume higher order self-regulatory functions of
executive control to be especially important during
this phase. In particular, choice between options will
involve working memory and inhibition, while goal
attainment will involve effective planning, inhibition,
and self-organization.
Appraisal and accommodation. This stage is
underpinned by reinforcement learning processes
– whereby a prediction error is generated through a
comparison of expected and derived utility, which
then feeds back to both the subjective expected
utility matrix and autobiographical memory. The
evaluation of the discrepancy between predicted
versus derived utility is influenced by the current
utility matrix, the self-regulation processes
required to hold intertemporal information in mind,
and autobiographical memory concerning prior
choices.
Neurobiological substrates
The model focuses on three distributed and inter-
acting brain systems. These include (a) the neural
circuitry controlling self-referential cognitions – the
© 2015 Association for Child and Adolescent Mental Health.
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so-called default mode network; (b) the network
involved in top-down executive control – including
lateralized regionsof theprefrontal andparietal cortex
and the dorsal striatum; and (c) the cortical–subcor-
tical circuits implicated in reinforcement learning,
encoding of value, and emotion processing – including
ventral regions of the prefrontal cortex (such as the
orbitofrontal cortex and theanterior cingulate cortex),
ventral striatum, insula, and amygdala. These net-
works interact with each other, providing an addi-
tional level of complexity. In the next section, we
examine the role of the three core neuropsychological
domains implicated in the model.
Self-referential processes. Effective decision mak-
ing is facilitated if one can disengage from the imme-
diate environment, stand back unencumbered by the
influence of imminent and tangible incentives, and
consider priorities across an extended timeframe –
integrating one’s current personal values and past
experiences into a coherent picture while envisioning
future possibilities. In recent years, there has been a
renewed interest in task-independent self-referential
cognition of this sort (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015)
and the ways in which such cognitive processes may
be disturbed in mental disorders (Andrews-Hanna,
Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014).
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Figure 1 A schematic representation of an integrated neuroeconomic model highlighting the complex interplay between multiple
psychological systems and neural circuits in the control of the decision-making process. The decision-making process itself is divided into
three distinct stages: Evaluation – where an estimate of the subjective utility of available choice options is made taking into account
memory and learning from prior experience as well as prospection about future value mediated by implicit reinforcement learning
mechanisms (encoded in a utility matrix) and explicit self-referential processes (autobiographical memory); decision and management –
during which the subjective utility assigned to competing alternatives is compared in terms of overall costs and benefits and a decision
plan is implemented – processes heavily influenced by higher order executive functions; appraisal and accommodation – utility actually
derived from decision is estimated (again on the basis of explicit and implicit value systems) and compared with prior expectations to
generate a prediction error signal which drives learning and updates implicit and explicit value estimates for particular experiences and
choices as represented by the feedback loops in the figure. The model proposes that these decision-making stages are primarily
controlled by three distinct brain systems: the default mode network (MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex;
LPC, lateral parietal cortex; MTG, medial temporal gyrus) primarily implicated in self-referential cognition but also in some aspects of self-
regulation; executive control system (DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; PAR, parietal cortex) which
mediates top-down control during self-regulation and planning; and reinforcement evaluation and learning circuits (OFC, orbitofrontal
cortex; AMYG, amygdala; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex, REINF, reinforcement)
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The role of such processes in decision making has
recently been discussed (Sonuga-Barke & Fairchild,
2012). A crucial feature is the idea that individuals
construct a coherent autobiographical script about
the personal meaning and subjective utility of past
choice outcomes and future choice options based on
a well-integrated concept of themselves as effective
economic agents (D’Argembeau et al., 2014). This
arises out of the ability to reflect on past experiences
to provide a basis for future choices (Addis, Wong, &
Schacter, 2007). The final self-referential element in
economic decision-making involves self-projection to
compare future outcome scenarios (Lin & Epstein,
2014) to estimate the subjective value of each choice.
In this way, self-referential processes play a positive
role in decision making. However, there is also a
potential downside. This arises from the fact that
when not properly regulated – for instance, occurring
in the wrong setting or at the wrong time or when an
individual engages in excessive negative rumination
– self-referential processes can lead to mind-wander-
ing or daydreaming which disrupts performance
(Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler,
2009) because of lapses of attention (Sonuga-Barke
& Castellanos, 2007).
The neural substrates of self-referential cognition
appear to be located along a cortical midline axis
with two major hubs – medial prefrontal cortex
(extending ventrally to include dorsal anterior cin-
gulate cortex) and medial parietal cortex – in partic-
ular, the posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus
(Snyder & Raichle, 2012). These regions, together
with circuits involving more lateral elements (i.e.
temporal-parietal junction and medial temporal
gyrus), form an interconnected set of regions known
as the default mode network. Because of its size,
location, and extensive range of connections to
cortical and subcortical structures, the cortical
midline axis operates as a coordinating hub, bring-
ing together internally generated thoughts and
externally available information about oneself and
others into a coherent narrative that integrates past
experiences to bear on future actions (Moran, Kelley,
& Heatherton, 2013). The regions of the default mode
network interact with brain regions responsible for
cognitive control (Smallwood, Brown, Baird, &
Schooler, 2012), reinforcement processing (Cauda
et al., 2011), memory (James, Tripathi, Ojemann,
Gross, & Drane, 2013), and emotion processing and
regulation (Chase, Moses-Kolko, Zevallos, Wisner, &
Phillips, 2014). Functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies have shown that default
mode nodes form a functional network at rest with
temporal coherence between constituent regions
which partly overlaps with patterns of white-matter
connectivity (Greicius, Supekar, Menon, & Dough-
erty, 2009; Vertes & Bullmore, 2015). The activity of
the default mode network is attenuated following
transitions to goal-directed tasks requiring effortful,
focused attention, and cognitive engagement (Snyder
& Raichle, 2012). The centrality of the default mode
network in economic decision making is supported
by findings from a recent meta-analysis of brain
activations during value computation (Clithero &
Rangel, 2014). More specifically, with regard to
economic decision-making, fMRI studies have impli-
cated a medial frontotemporal axis as a putative
neural mechanism underpinning the bridge between
self-referential retrospection and prospection (Buck-
ner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008) with medial
prefrontal cortex and medial temporal gyrus inter-
acting to facilitate prospection (Lavallee & Persinger,
2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010). This is consistent with
data showing that the latter is involved in autobio-
graphical memory retrieval, which provides the
foundation for internal mentation (Lavallee & Per-
singer, 2010; Tulving, 2002), while medial prefrontal
cortex is implicated in self-related future simulations
central to the consideration of future choice out-
comes (Kim, 2012) and complex perspective-taking
processes (Van Hoeck et al., 2013). Medial pre-
frontal–posterior cingulate cortex circuits regulate
self-initiated goal formation and planning in con-
junction with dorsal attention networks (Spreng,
Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010).
Furthermore, these brain regions appear to play a
role, in concert with the orbitofrontal cortex, in
sustaining long-term goal states. In addition, the
frontopolar cortex plays a complementary role in
protecting the execution of long-term economic plans
to allow implementation of decisions (Koechlin &
Hyafil, 2007).
Evidence for disruptions of task-independent and
self-referential thought and the associated default
mode network in mental disorders has been avail-
able for some time (Broyd et al., 2009). Two general
models have been proposed. First, mental disorders
often impair self-referential processes (reducing the
ability to form autobiographical memories or envi-
sion the future), on the one hand, or distort the
content of such processes on the other (leading to a
focus on negative experiences or personal failures;
Andrews-Hanna et al. 2014). These may, in turn,
impair particular stages of the decision-making
process, disrupt the transition between decision
stages, or introduce pathological biases into others.
Altered self-referential processes are reflected in
patterns of altered connectivity during rest and
introspection either within or between default mode
hubs and other systems involved in cognitive control
or emotion processing. Second, there is evidence that
some individuals with mental disorders show
impaired modulation of default mode activity during
task performance (Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos,
2007). This allows intrusive self-referential thoughts
(e.g. mind wandering) to undermine task perfor-
mance. Such intrusions could have multiple origins,
and these are likely to differ between disorders.
Intrusions of self-referential thought during task
performance may also be content-driven – for exam-
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ple, they could be associated with a compulsion to
dwell on past events or worry about the future
(Servaas, Riese, Ormel, & Aleman, 2014), in both
cases leading to excessive default mode activity.
Executive control. Executive function is an
umbrella term that refers to a heterogeneous group-
ing of top-down processes that allow individuals to
regulate their thoughts and behavior to successfully
engage in purposeful, goal-directed, and future-
oriented actions (Suchy, 2009). There is general
consensus among researchers that EFs comprise
three core types: inhibition, working memory, and
cognitive flexibility (Lehto & Elorinne, 2003; Miyake
et al., 2000). Inhibition encompasses the suppres-
sion of prepotent responses (i.e. response inhibition)
and control of interference from extraneous stimuli
and distracting internal mental representations
(Diamond, 2013). Working memory has multiple
interrelated components. In the most well-regarded
model, visuospatial and verbal working memory
work together with a central executive to allow the
simultaneous holding in mind and manipulation of
multiple units of information (Baddeley & Hitch,
1974). Finally, cognitive flexibility is the process
involved in the changing of perspective and response
sets – adjusting how one thinks about something –
and being sufficiently flexible to change in response
to demands and/or priorities (Diamond, 2013).
Additional higher order executive functions, such
as reasoning, problem solving, and planning, are
conceptualized as processes that build on the afore-
mentioned more basic processes (Collins & Koechlin,
2012; Lunt et al., 2012). Despite continued debate,
it is acknowledged that these different executive
processes represent separable but moderately
correlated constructs (Miyake et al., 2000).
From the perspective of our model, executive func-
tions are related to decision making in several ways.
First, in general terms, they provide the basis for
deliberative processes and development of decision
plans (Bickel, Pitcock, Yi, & Angtuaco, 2009). Sec-
ond, cognitive flexibility allows one to consider alter-
native options simultaneously (Diamond, 2013).
Third, inhibitory control provides the time to reflect
effectively on choice alternatives, while working
memory allows multiple units of information to be
assimilated and compared (Amso, Haas, McShane, &
Badre, 2014). Fourth, executive control is also
required for planning the implementation of the
selected option (choice), together with the prospective
information derived from task-independent pro-
cesses (Suchy, 2009). Additionally, executive func-
tions, in particular, inhibitory control, are involved in
resisting interference from competing options during
the implementation of plans (Sylvester et al., 2003).
Executive functions are most engaged when the
novelty or complexity of a situation makes it
impossible to rely only on automatic responses or
when control is required in the face of motivationally
salient events (so called hot executive function
settings; Kerr and Zelazo 2004). This latter situation
is especially common in the context of economic
decision making (Krain, Wilson, Arbuckle, Castel-
lanos, & Milham, 2006). Executive functions are also
implicated in timing, which may be important for
decision-making processes – especially perceptual
timing and temporal foresight (Noreika, Falter, &
Rubia, 2013). Inhibitory control and working mem-
ory are pivotal in tasks involving duration discrim-
ination, time reproduction (Noreika et al., 2013), and
temporal foresight (Lin & Epstein, 2014).
Traditionally, different executive functions have
been localized to specific divisions of the prefrontal
cortex: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for working
memory (Fuster, 1999); medial prefrontal cortex
(including the anterior cingulate) for flexibility (Bush
et al., 1999); ventral prefrontal cortex (including
orbitofrontal and ventromedial) for inhibition (Trem-
blay & Schultz, 2000); and frontal pole (including
anterior portions of the dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex) for the higher order integration of executive
functions (Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, & Graf-
man, 1999). However, it is now clear that the neural
substrate of executive functions is better understood
in terms of brain networks implicating basal ganglia,
thalamus, cerebellum, and cortical regions outside
the prefrontal cortex. For instance, working memory
is controlled by a frontoparietal network (Darki &
Klingberg, 2015) with the response inhibition net-
work incorporating projections to the basal ganglia
(in particular the caudate) and the thalamus (Suchy,
2009). In addition, both the right and left dorsolat-
eral prefrontal areas and the superior medial frontal
lobe have been implicated in tasks that involve
cognitive switching (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). Shift-
ing processes also activate parietal lobe and left
middle and inferior prefrontal gyri (Jurado & Ros-
selli, 2007). A meta-analysis (Houde, Rossi, Lubin, &
Joliot, 2010) of task-based fMRI studies exploring
executive functions in youth found that bilateral
prefrontal areas, including the dorsolateral pre-
frontal and inferior prefrontal cortices, extending to
the insular cortex, as well as related posterior
parietal and occipital areas, were consistently acti-
vated in youth, mirroring findings in adults (Nien-
dam et al., 2012).
Executive functions are essential for cognitive,
social, and psychological development (Diamond,
2013), as well as positive academic (Borella, Carretti,
& Pelegrina, 2010) and professional outcomes (Bai-
ley, 2007). Given this, it comes as no surprise that a
growing body of evidence points to executive function
impairment in mental disorders, including, among
others, substance use disorders (Baler & Volkow,
2006), schizophrenia (Barch, 2005), and obsessive
compulsive disorder (Penades et al., 2007). In
general terms, there are a number of models of
executive function deficits in psychopathology. First,
there are models that postulate core executive func-
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tion deficits with disruptions in top-down control
contributing to the main deficits that characterize
the disorder (Barkley, 1997; Oosterlaan, Logan, &
Sergeant, 1998). Second, there are models that
implicate altered energetic processes as a factor
undermining the supply of effortful cognitive control
(Sergeant, 2000), concluding that the degree of
inhibitory control is dependent on the individual’s
state and the allocation of energy to the tasks. Third,
models propose specific deficits in the regulation of
emotionally and motivationally charged responses
(Moon & Jeong, 2015). Finally, there are models that
argue that executive function deficits arise out of
other aspects of a disorder – so for instance in
Eysenck et al.’s attentional control theory (Eysenck,
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), the worry and
rumination that characterize affective disorders limit
the resources available for effective executive con-
trol.
Reinforcement processes- valuation and learn-
ing. A choice between two or more options is
predicated on the ability to make a judgment about
the likely subjective utility to be derived from the
respective options. Such processes are complex and
likely to involve, on the one hand, conscious and
explicit autobiographical memory processes, and on
the other hand, implicit reinforcement-related pro-
cesses. With regard to the latter, it is now clear that
specific neural circuits are implicated in (a) the
prospective valuation of possible events, (b) the
appraisal of outcomes, and (c) the updating of what
we have termed the utility matrix that informs these
through the process of reinforcement learning.
Through this neurobiologically based set of pro-
cesses, individuals are able to adapt their behavior
in complex environments, learn from experience,
and predict the likely consequences of their actions
(Dayan & Niv, 2008; Stringaris, 2015).
At the core of these reinforcement processes is a
mechanism through which the discrepancy between
the subjective utility actually derived from a choice
compared with that initially predicted is computed.
This discrepancy is encoded by a prediction error
signal, which is positive if the outcome is better and
negative if the outcome is worse than expected
(Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Stringaris,
2015) – leading to the updating of the individual’s
estimation of the value of choices (Rushworth, Noo-
nan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011; Stringaris,
2015). Theseprocessescanbemodeled formallyusing
reinforcement learning algorithms, such as the tem-
poral difference learning rule (Sutton & Barto, 1998),
and the resulting models can be fitted to fMRI data to
investigate neural signals related to expected value or
prediction error computations in humans (O’Doherty,
Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 2003).
The ability to generate value signals for different
options is fundamental to the evaluation phase of
decision making. This process involves converting all
the anticipated benefits and costs of different choice
alternatives into a common ‘currency’ so that they
can be compared with each other (Chib, Rangel,
Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011;
Stringaris, 2015). The decision maker also needs to
be able to integrate across a range of different
parameters (e.g. potential gains or losses, probability
of outcomes, and delay until outcome receipt) when
selecting between options. In addition, reinforce-
ment processes are involved in the evaluation stage
of decision making in at least two ways. First, they
mediate the hedonic experience associated with
rewarding outcomes, that is, they provide a neural
substrate for the subjective experience of reward.
Second, they enable the individual to learn from
experience and update the expected value represen-
tations that influence future decisions (as described
above).
A number of brain regions and networks have been
implicated in valuation and learning. There is exten-
sive evidence that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
orbitofrontal cortex, and ventral striatum are
involved in coding the value of options, particularly
when a choice is required (Kim, Shimojo, & O’Doh-
erty, 2006; Lebreton, Jorge, Michel, Thirion, &
Pessiglione, 2009; Plassmann et al., 2010). Interest-
ingly, such value signals appear to be modulated by
parameters which influence choice behavior, such as
valence, probability/risk, delay, and the individual’s
motivational state (e.g. Gottfried, O’Doherty, and
Dolan 2003). The ventromedial prefrontal/or-
bitofrontal cortex is also activated during the receipt
of rewarding outcomes, regardless of modality and
type of reward (i.e. it is responsive to primary and
secondary reinforcement; Kim et al., 2006; Liu,
Hairston, Schrier, and Fan 2011). Prediction error
signals appear to be encoded by dopaminergic neu-
rons in the striatum (and particularly ventral stria-
tum), the ventral tegmental area, amygdala, and
orbitofrontal cortex (D’Ardenne, McClure, Nystrom,
& Cohen, 2008; Niv, Edlund, Dayan, & O’Doherty,
2012; O’Doherty et al., 2003). Negative outcomes
(both anticipated and received) are processed by
specific brain regions such as the amygdala and
insula that are known to play a broader role in
emotion processing and regulation (Barrett, Mes-
quita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Ochsner & Gross,
2005). The amygdala, in particular, is heavily con-
nected to other key elements of the reinforcement
system (Kim et al., 2011).
Neuroimaging studies investigating the processing
of rewards or negative outcomes have demonstrated
that the brain is sensitive to the valence of outcomes,
with ventromedial prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex
activation increasing when rewards are received
and decreasing in response to loss outcomes (Kim
et al., 2006; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007).
A meta-analysis of fMRI studies of decision making
found that rewarding outcomes (encompassing
monetary rewards) activated the striatum, anterior
© 2015 Association for Child and Adolescent Mental Health.
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insula, medial orbitofrontal, and rostral anterior
cingulate cortex (Liu et al., 2011). Negative outcomes
also triggered striatal and anterior insular activity,
but additional activations were observed in lateral
orbitofrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex, and amygdala (Liu et al.,
2011). This meta-analysis suggests that brain
regions involved in processing positively and nega-
tively valenced information are highly overlapping,
but the direction of the change in activity may vary
within the same regions (e.g. medial orbitofrontal
cortex or ventral striatum) according to valence (Kim
et al., 2006). Interestingly, the direct contrast of
rewarding versus negative outcomes revealed multi-
ple regions (e.g. medial orbitofrontal cortex and
ventral striatum) that were more sensitive to the
former than the latter, whereas only lateral orbito-
frontal cortex and caudal regions of the anterior
cingulate were more sensitive to negative outcomes.
Functional MRI studies attempting to disaggregate
value and risk processing in healthy adults have
demonstrated that these parameters are encoded in
partially distinct brain networks. While value signals
are primarily encoded in orbitofrontal cortex and
ventral striatum as noted above, risk or outcome
uncertainty is correlated with lateral orbitofrontal
cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate activity (Chris-
topoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009;
Tobler, O’Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2007). In
addition, a region in medial frontal cortex appears
to integrate these signals according to the individ-
ual’s risk attitudes (Tobler et al., 2007). Such find-
ings implicating the lateral orbitofrontal cortex in
risk processing are consistent with neuropsycholog-
ical studies showing heightened risk-taking follow-
ing orbitofrontal cortex lesions (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs,
Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Sanfey, Hastie, Colvin, &
Grafman, 2003) or at least lesions that disrupt
adjacent fibers (Rudebeck, Saunders, Prescott,
Chau, & Murray, 2013). Finally, a number of studies
have investigated neural activity when the individual
is selecting between immediate and delayed rewards
(Kable & Glimcher, 2007; McClure, Laibson,
Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Using an intertempo-
ral choice task, Kable and Glimcher (2007) showed
that ventral striatal, medial orbitofrontal cortex, and
posterior cingulate cortex activation were inversely
related to the length of the delay before reward
delivery. Consequently, these regions appear to play
an important role in temporal discounting of delayed
rewards. However, it should be noted that there are
substantial individual differences in rates of tempo-
ral discounting, even among healthy adults and
children (Olson et al., 2009), and such differences
appear to map onto neural activity (e.g. individuals
showing the shallowest discounting functions in
their choice behavior also exhibited the weakest
effects of delay imposition on neural activity; Kable &
Glimcher, 2007)] In related work, McClure et al.
(2004) observed increased medial orbitofrontal
cortex, ventral striatum, and posterior cingulate
cortex activity when subjects selected immediate
monetary rewards, whereas lateral orbitofrontal
cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were acti-
vated during intertemporal choice regardless of
delay. Similar results were obtained using primary
reinforcement (i.e. immediate or delayed juice deliv-
ery; McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, &
Cohen, 2007). These results were interpreted as
evidence that distinct neural systems (impulsive/
automatic vs. deliberative) were in competition dur-
ing intertemporal choice.
Learning and evaluation processes have been
implicated in mental disorders in a number of ways
(Luman, Tripp, & Scheres, 2010; Sonuga-Barke,
2011). First, individuals with mental disorders may
show a general insensitivity to reinforcement (both
positive and negative), which influences both the
encoding of cues and processing of outcomes (e.g.
depression – Pizzagalli, 2014). Second, certain forms
of psychopathology may be underpinned by deficits
in reward or punishment learning, due to impair-
ments in generating stimulus–response–outcome
representations (e.g. schizophrenia; Waltz, Frank,
Robinson, and Gold 2007). This could be due to
insensitivity to either positive or negative feedback
and reduced ability to adjust behavior according to
environmental contingencies. Third, individuals with
mental disorders may display a specific insensitivity
to either rewarding or punishing outcomes. Fourth,
cue and outcome processing could be essentially
intact, but the process of comparing different out-
comes may be disrupted (i.e. affecting the decision/
implementation phase of decision making). Fifth,
individuals with mental disorders might display
normal sensitivity to external reinforcement but
deficits in intrinsic reinforcement or vice versa.
Related to this concept, individuals with psy-
chopathology may show domain-specific impair-
ments in reinforcement, for example, reduced
sensitivity to social reinforcement (praise) but nor-
mal sensitivity to monetary reinforcement (Demurie,
Roeyers, Baeyens, & Sonuga-Barke, 2011; Scott-Van
Zeeland, Dapretto, Ghahremani, Poldrack, & Book-
heimer, 2010). The final set of models suggests that
the preference structures that guide the evaluation
process are altered in individuals with psychopathol-
ogy, perhaps due to early adversity or living in
unpredictable environments (e.g. conduct disorder;
Sonuga-Barke, 2014). According to this view, such
individuals are capable of evaluating options, imple-
menting decisions, and appraising outcomes, but
the weighting of different parameters, such as risk or
delay, in the evaluation process is altered in a
relatively stable manner.
Disorder-specific hypotheses
In this section, we first present individual hypothe-
ses regarding the different behavioral expressions,
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and associated neurobiological and neuropsycholog-
ical processes, of impaired decisionmaking in ADHD,
CD, anxiety, and depression based on our neuroeco-
nomic model (Figure 1). We acknowledge that addi-
tional systems (e.g. autonomic nervous system) are
almost certainly affected in these disorders and
implicated in decision making, but due to space
limitations, these systems are only considered briefly
here. Our primary aim is to explore potential differ-
ences between disorders in terms of decision making
and motivational styles. Our hypotheses, therefore,
emphasize differences rather than similarities
between disorders – a point which is particularly
relevant when contrasting decision making in the
highly overlapping conditions of anxiety and depres-
sion. Finally, althoughasystematic reviewof evidence
is beyond the scope of this article, we briefly consider
indicative evidence, focusing on data from children
and adolescentswhere available – although itmust be
noted that we have frequently had to rely on adult
data, with all of the caveats this implies. Figure 2
provides a summary of the hypotheses for the four
disorders as these relate to different decision-making
stages and neurocognitive systems.
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
Background
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder is a preva-
lent, debilitating life-span condition marked by
developmentally inappropriate levels of hyperactiv-
ity, impulsivity, and/or inattention (Faraone et al.,
2015). Clinically, it is highly comorbid with both
externalizing (e.g. CD) and internalizing (e.g. depres-
sion) problems. Pathophysiologically, it is heteroge-
neous, with different ADHD individuals displaying
marked variation in the profile of contributing
factors and deficits across multiple brain networks
(Sonuga-Barke, Bitsakou, & Thompson, 2010). Mul-
timodal treatment is supported empirically, with
medication targeting the core and associated symp-
toms (Banaschewski et al., 2006) and behavioral
approaches used to treat co-occurring problems,
such as antisocial behaviors and social skills deficits
(Daley et al., 2014).
Core hypotheses regarding impaired decision
making in ADHD
Alterations in multiple brain systems interact to
disrupt self-referential, executive, and reinforcement
processes that act across processing stages to pro-
duce decision making that is both deficient (i.e.
inefficient, insufficiently reflective, and inconsistent)
and impulsive (biased toward immediate over
delayed alternatives).
Evaluation. (a) Disturbed prospection of future
events and states due to disrupted connectivity
between core midline and lateralized nodes of the
default mode network combines with deficient rein-
forcement signaling within ventral frontostriatal cir-
cuits to impair the ability to estimate the subjective
utility of choice alternatives. (b) A bias toward
choosing immediate overdelayed rewards arises from
a combination of reduced signaling of future rein-
forcement in the ventral striatum and heightened
aversion to delay linked to amygdala hyperactiva-
tion.
Decision and management. (a) A generalized def-
icit in top-down executive control mediated by
disruptions in frontostriatal and frontoparietal cir-
cuits reduces the speed and efficiency of decision
making – effects compounded by spontaneous
lapses in attention linked to interference from
default mode-related task-independent thoughts.
(b) Impairments in the ability to generate and
implement plans consistently without changing or
reversing preferences are linked to dysconnectivity
between default and executive networks (medial
prefrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and
failures to resist the lure of competing choice alter-
natives and distracting influences due to executive
dysfunction.
Appraisal and accommodation. The ability to com-
pare predicted and derived utility (i.e. prediction
error signal) and thus learn from experience is
degraded by disruptions in anterior cingulate cor-
tex–orbitofrontal cortex connectivity.
Empirical indications
Dysregulation of self-referential processes. To
date, no direct study of self-referential processes in
decision making in ADHD has been undertaken.
However, evidence linking ADHD to dysfunction
within the default mode network, hypothesized to
subserve effective self-referential cognition, has
accumulated in recent years. Resting state fMRI
studies have demonstrated disrupted connectivity
between midline hubs of the default mode in ADHD
(Castellanos et al., 2008). A recent study found a
general developmental lag in intrinsic default mode
network structure in ADHD and disrupted connec-
tions to executive and attentional networks (Sripada,
Kessler, & Angstadt, 2014). Other studies found that
ADHD individuals have difficulties in regulating
default mode activity appropriately to respond to
external demands, leading to excessive activity
within this network during task performance (Helps
et al., 2010; Liddle et al., 2011). In terms of evidence
relating to the dysregulation of putative self-refer-
ential processes underpinned by default mode dys-
function in ADHD, there is both direct and
circumstantial evidence. Most directly, Seli, Small-
wood, Cheyne, & Smilek (2015 recently reported
evidence of a link between ADHD in young adults
© 2015 Association for Child and Adolescent Mental Health.
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and the sort of spontaneous, dysfunctional, and
uncontrolled mind-wandering associated with disor-
ganized introspection and lapses of attention during
external tasks – contrasting this with the deliberate,
well-regulated and functional self-referential
thought required for effective prospection and plan-
ning. Direct evidence linking this form of maladap-
tive mind-wandering and attention in ADHD is not
yet available although mind-wandering has been
directly linked to attentional lapses (Smallwood,
McSpadden, Luus, & Schooler, 2008) and low--
frequency signatures in reaction time data, charac-
teristic of such lapses, have been observed
repeatedly in ADHD (Karalunas, Geurts, Konrad,
Bender, & Nigg, 2014). More circumstantially, defi-
cits in autobiographical and prospective memory
have been observed. Fuermaier et al. (2013) demon-
strated ADHD-related deficits in both self-rated and
objectively assessed prospective memory. Further-
more, the same group narrowed this effect down
specifically to deficits in long-term planning rather
than the recall of planned action, plan integrity, or
self-initiation. Support for difficulties in long-term
planning functions also comes from a number of
sources including in relation to goal setting
(Nyman et al., 2010), ‘if-then’ plans (Gawrilow,
Merkt, Goossens-Merkt, Bodenburg, & Wendt,
2011) and planning scripts (Desjardins, Scherzer,
Braun, Godbout, & Poissant, 2010). Prospective
memory, especially time-, as opposed to event-
based memory, also appears to be impaired in
ADHD (Talbot & Kerns, 2014). Fabio & Capri
(2015) found that deficits in autobiographical
memory inhibited the ability of ADHD children to
access personal events in the past while (Klein,
Gangi, & Lax, 2011) demonstrated an association
between ADHD and disorganized personal narra-
tives when asked to access episodic self-referential
terms. Scholtens, Rydell, & Yang-Wallentin (2013)
found reduced future orientation regarding aca-
demic matters in adolescent ADHD.
Impaired executive control. There is now consid-
erable evidence relating to executive functions in
ADHD. Meta-analyses provide evidence of ADHD-
related deficits in inhibition (Lipszyc & Schachar,
2010), interference control (Lansbergen, Kenemans,
& van Engeland, 2007), and working memory
(Alderson, Kasper, Hudec, & Patros, 2013), which
are likely to impact on decision making. Deficits in
higher order executive processes such as atten-
tional flexibility and short-term planning are also
apparent (Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone, & Pen-
nington, 2005). This evidence from neuropsycho-
logical tests converges with neuroimaging evidence,
which highlights ADHD-related alterations in later-
alized frontoparietal and frontostriatal structure
(Pironti et al., 2014) and function (Cortese et al.,
2012). The relationship between executive control
and decision making in ADHD has been examined
in two ways. First, there is a large and growing
literature on decision making about rewards under
conditions of uncertainty and risk – so-called hot
executive settings. Results to date are mixed and
open to interpretation (Groen, Gaastra, Lewis-
Evans, & Tucha, 2013). Around 50% of these
studies found that ADHD individuals make poorer
and riskier decisions than controls. However,
because of the complex and cognitively demanding
nature of the tasks and their reliance on multiple
processes, these positive results are challenging to
map onto specific cognitive processes (Brand,
Franke-Sievert, Jacoby, Markowitsch, & Tuschen-
Caffier, 2007). Probably most informative is the
Cambridge Gambling Task which allows different
decision-making elements to be disentangled
(Manes et al., 2002). The studies using this task
found that ADHD individuals make suboptimal
choices, but this relates to problems in processing
and adjusting information about risk or to delay
aversion (i.e. choosing the earliest available option;
see below) rather than risk proneness per se (Cog-
hill, Seth, & Matthews, 2014; DeVito et al., 2008).
Second, a number of studies have examined the
links between decision making and executive func-
tions in ADHD by including paradigms measuring
both processes. For instance, Duarte, Woods,
Rooney, Atkinson, & Grant (2012) found that sub-
optimal decision making on the Iowa Gambling
Task was related to working memory deficits in
ADHD. Drechsler, Rizzo, & Steinhausen (2008)
found that poor decision making on a gambling
task was related to inhibitory control deficits, but
not working memory problems, in ADHD. However,
no studies have specifically explored the neural
basis of the cognitive impairments leading to poor
decision making in ADHD.
Impaired reinforcement processes. Imaging stud-
ies have implicated structural alterations in the
neural circuits and regions that mediate reinforce-
ment-related processes – including the orbitofrontal
cortex (Hesslinger et al., 2002) and the ventral
striatum (Carmona et al., 2009). In terms of diffi-
culties with processing signals of future reinforce-
ment, a recent meta-analysis confirmed ventral
striatal hyporesponsiveness in individuals with
ADHD (Plichta & Scheres, 2014), which appears
independent from dysfunction in executive control
networks (Carmona et al., 2012). Wilbertz et al.
(2012) also found reduced orbitofrontal cortex sen-
sitivity to reward magnitude changes in adult
ADHD. There is evidence of functional hyperconnec-
tivity between core hubs of the reward circuit
(Tomasi & Volkow, 2012). Evidence from behavioral
tasks gives a rather mixed picture (Luman, Ser-
geant, Knol, & Oosterlaan, 2010), with some studies
suggesting oversensitivity to rewards (Fosco, Hawk,
Rosch, & Bubnik, 2015) and others showing
hyposensitivity (van Meel, Heslenfeld, Oosterlaan,
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Luman, & Sergeant, 2011) related to impaired
reward-related prediction error signals (Thoma,
Edel, Suchan, & Bellebaum, 2015). In line with
our predictions, the most consistent finding relates
to an accentuated sensitivity to delay prior to the
delivery of reinforcement, which holds regardless of
the paradigm used (Yu, Sonuga-Barke, & Liu, 2015)
and seems to reflect a combination of a drive toward
immediate reinforcement (Marco et al., 2009),
heightened discounting of delayed reinforcement
(Scheres, Tontsch, & Thoeny, 2013) and aversion
to delay – a desire to escape the negative affect
induced by delay (Lemiere et al., 2012). The limited
neuroimaging evidence available is consistent with
this picture, with increased discounting in ADHD
associated with atypical connectivity between the
ventral striatum and executive control regions
(Costa Dias et al., 2013), while cues of impending
delay lead to enhanced activation of limbic regions
known to encode aversive stimuli (i.e. amygdala and
anterior insula) in ADHD individuals (Wilbertz et al.,
2013). Surprisingly, few studies have investigated
reinforcement learning per se in ADHD, given the
centrality of this process to two highly influential
models of ADHD (Sagvolden, Johansen, Aase, &
Russell, 2005; Tripp & Wickens, 2008). Two recent
studies are particularly relevant here. Luman, Goos,
& Oosterlaan (2015) found that children with ADHD
learned at the same rate as controls on an instru-
mental learning task. In contrast, Hauser et al.
(2014) observed reduced reward medial prefrontal
cortex prediction error signals in adolescents with
ADHD during reversal learning task performance,
supporting the hypothesis that reinforcement learn-
ing is disrupted in ADHD.
Summary of ADHD-related research priorities
Perhaps in contrast to other disorders reviewed
here, there is already a substantial and growing
body of evidence either directly examining key
aspects of decision making in ADHD or at least
exploring systems and processes hypothesized to be
involved in decision making. Much of this work was
done in children and adolescents. However, the
extant literature lacks integration and the field
remains fragmented. Furthermore, key questions
remain unaddressed. We feel that three key
research priorities are (a) to study the way that
explicit self-referential cognitive and implicit rein-
forcement-related processes interact during the
evaluation stage of decision making and whether
this contributes to the way value is assigned by
individuals with ADHD; (b) to explicitly examine the
role played by prospection and its neural substrates
in decision making about future rewards in ADHD;
and (c) to better understand how aberrant rein-
forcement processing in ADHD influences learning
and how this in turn feeds back to affect stimulus
evaluation.
Conduct disorder
Background
Conduct disorder is characterized by a persistent and
pervasive pattern of antisocial and aggressive behavior
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). It typically
emerges in either childhood or adolescence and is
predictive of antisocial personality disorder (Copeland,
Shanahan, Costello, & Angold, 2009; Lahey, Loeber,
Burke, & Applegate, 2005; Robins, 1978) and other
negative adult outcomes (Burke, Rowe, & Boylan,
2014; Copeland et al., 2009; Moffitt, Caspi, Harring-
ton, & Milne, 2002; Odgers et al., 2007). Although
comorbidity rates are highest with other externalizing
disorders (e.g. ADHD), there is also substantial overlap
with internalizing disorders (e.g. depression and anx-
iety; Fergusson, Horwood, & Ridder, 2005; Lahey &
Waldman, 2012). Conduct disorder can be subclassi-
fied based on age-of-onset (childhood vs. adolescence-
onset; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) or in
terms of associated personality characteristics (e.g.
callous-unemotional traits; Burt, Donnellan, Iacono,
&McGue, 2011; Frick, Ray, Thornton, & Kahn, 2014).
Disruptions inbrain regions suchas theamygdala and
anterior insula that are involved in the processing of
valence and emotional and motivational salience are
implicated inCD.Structural and functional changes in
frontal and temporal regions have also been reported
(Baker, Clanton, Rogers, & De Brito, 2015; Fairchild
et al., 2011, 2013, 2015; Hyatt, Haney-Caron, &
Stevens, 2012; Rubia, 2011). Treatment options
include parenting interventions and multisystemic
therapy (NICE 2013). However, atypical antipsychotic
medications may be used with patients who are
unresponsive to psychosocial interventions (Reyes,
Buitelaar, Toren, Augustyns, & Eerdekens, 2006).
Core hypotheses regarding impaired decision
making in CD
Disturbances in reinforcement mechanisms, and
related brain circuits, impact evaluation and apprai-
sal/accommodation stages of decision making with
specific effects on the processing of negative stimuli,
producing reckless choices and insensitivity to neg-
ative consequences.
Evaluation. (a) Altered structure and function
within, and disrupted connectivity between, amyg-
dala/insula and orbitofrontal cortex generally impair
the subjective estimation of negative future events.
This reduces the impact of signals of future punish-
ment, risk/uncertainty, and delay on decision mak-
ing, which is especially pronounced for options
combining multiple negative elements (e.g. delayed
negative outcomes/distal punishments).
Decision and management. We predict that these
processes are largely unaffected in CD when not
comorbid with ADHD.
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Appraisal and accommodation. Individuals with
CD display normal or enhanced sensitivity to posi-
tive or rewarding outcomes but reduced sensitivity to
aversive outcomes, blunting their response to, and
reducing their ability to learn from, negative feed-
back. These effects are mediated by hypoactivation
of the brain’s punishment centers – amygdala and
anterior insula – and associated striatal regions, and
deficient prediction error signals for aversive events.
Empirical indications
Evaluation of aversive or risk-related cues. The
decision making of children and adolescents with CD
or oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) has been
studied using four types of tasks involving (a) deci-
sion making under risk (outcome probabilities are
explicitly presented); (b) decision making under
uncertainty (key information is unavailable or where
learning is required); (c) reversal learning (where
contingencies change); and (d) passive avoidance
learning. An early study found no group differences
in Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance at baseline
(Ernst et al., 2003) although unlike controls, CD
individuals failed to show performance improve-
ments a week later. More recently, Schutter, van
Bokhoven, Vanderschuren, Lochman, and Matthys
(2011) found that adolescents with CD/ODD and
substance use disorders failed to learn to avoid risky
decks associated with large penalties. A study using
a modified gambling task obtained similar findings
in children with ODD (Luman et al., 2010). In
contrast, Fairchild et al. (2009) found that CD was
associated with increased risky decision making
under risk, suggested heightened sensitivity to gains
or reduced sensitivity to losses during the evaluation
phase of decision making. Crowley, Raymond, Miku-
lich-Gilbertson, Thompson, & Lejuez (2006) found
that adolescents with CD and substance use disor-
ders made more risky choices than control subjects
using the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). Using
the same task, Humphreys and Lee (2011) found
that children with comorbid ODD+ADHD made
riskier choices than controls, whereas the ODD-only
group was less sensitive to punishment than con-
trols. Collectively, these findings suggest that indi-
viduals with CD or ODD have difficulties in adjusting
their behavior following negative reinforcement or
punishment, whereas studies assessing decision
making under risk indicate that CD is associated
with altered sensitivity to gains and/or losses during
choice evaluation. A recent study investigating
intertemporal choice showed heightened temporal
discounting in adolescents with CD relative to con-
trols (White, Clanton et al., 2014). Interestingly,
these findings remained significant when excluding
participants with comorbid ADHD. This suggests a
more present-orientated motivational style in CD or
alternatively that CD is independently associated
with delay aversion. An fMRI study observed hypoac-
tivation in multiple brain regions in individuals with
both CD and substance use disorders (SUDs) during
the evaluation phase of decision making (Crowley
et al., 2010). The regions implicated included mul-
tiple areas in prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate
cortex, insula, and amygdala, as well as temporal
and parietal cortices. The CD+SUDs group also
showed reduced activation when receiving rewarding
feedback in anterior cingulate and temporal and
visual cortices, but increased responses to losses in
several frontal and temporal regions relative to
controls.
Impaired reinforcement processes. Learning from
aversive events is impaired in those with CD, and
such effects are correlated with variations in the
severity or persistence of CD. Adolescents with CD,
like adults with antisocial personality disorder (Flor
et al., 2002), show deficient autonomic conditioning
(Fairchild, Stobbe, van Goozen, Calder, & Goodyer,
2010; Fairchild, van Goozen, Stollery, & Goodyer,
2008). Reduced autonomic conditioning at age 3
predicted increased criminal behavior in adulthood
(Gao, Raine, Venables, Dawson, & Mednick, 2010),
whereas intact conditioning in midadolescence was
associated with better outcomes in a high-risk group
(Brennan et al., 1997). Deficient acquisition of con-
ditioning was associated with higher rates of offend-
ing within a group of young offenders (Syngelaki,
Fairchild, Moore, Savage, & van Goozen, 2013b).
Importantly, most studies have not found CD-related
effects on general autonomic reactivity to aversive
unconditioned stimuli. While these findings appear
to challenge the idea of a general impairment in the
processing of negative stimuli, other studies have
observed CD-related reductions in eye-blink startle
or skin conductance responses to aversive stimuli
(Fairchild et al., 2008; van Goozen, Snoek, Matthys,
van Rossum, & van Engeland, 2004; Syngelaki,
Fairchild, Moore, Savage, & van Goozen, 2013a).
Consequently, it is currently unclear whether there
is a primary deficit in responsiveness to aversive
stimuli or a disproportionate impairment in learning
from punishment. Indeed, it is plausible that both
processes are impaired and reduced sensitivity to
aversive stimuli contributes to associative learning
difficulties.
Structural MRI studies have observed reduced
anterior insula, orbitofrontal cortex, and striatal
gray-matter volume in CD (Fairchild et al., 2011,
2013; Sterzer, Stadler, Poustka, & Kleinschmidt,
2007), suggesting that CD is associated with struc-
tural, as well as functional, abnormalities in key
regions of the valuation network. Rubia et al. (2009)
observed reduced orbitofrontal cortex responses to
rewarding outcomes in boys with childhood-onset
CD. A recent study found no group differences in
neural activity during reward or loss anticipation
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when comparing adolescents with persisting and
desisting conduct problems and controls (Cohn
et al., 2014). However, the persistent disruptive
behavior disorder (DBD) group demonstrated
reduced ventral striatal activity during reward
receipt and increased amygdala responses to receipt
of losses. In a passive avoidance task with monetary
rewards and punishments, adolescents with DBDs
showed weaker expected value signals in ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex when choosing to respond to
stimuli and weaker expected value signals in insula
when choosing not to respond (White et al., 2013).
They also displayed reduced positive and increased
negative prediction error signals in the caudate when
receiving feedback. In a follow-up study using envi-
ronmental reinforcers, adolescents with DBDs
showed reduced expected value signals in caudate
nucleus, thalamus, and posterior cingulate cortex
when making suboptimal decisions (White, Fowler
et al., 2014). These studies support the hypothesis
that individuals with CD show deficits in expected
value signals for aversive outcomes and altered
prediction error signals, although it is currently
unclear whether both reward-related and aversive
expected value signals are disrupted.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies
of emotion processing have demonstrated that
adolescents with CD show reduced activity in the
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, insula,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and caudate nucleus
(Fairchild et al., 2014; Lockwood et al., 2013; Pas-
samonti et al., 2010; Sterzer, Stadler, Krebs, Klein-
schmidt, & Poustka, 2005). However, in contrast
with the findings described above, a study combin-
ing psychophysiological and fMRI methods found no
significant differences in autonomic fear condition-
ing between persistent and desisting DBD groups
and controls, but increased anterior cingulate cor-
tex/insula responses to the conditioned stimulus in
both DBD groups relative to controls (Cohn et al.,
2013). These divergent findings may have been
explained by elevated anxiety in both the DBD
groups.
Summary of CD-related research priorities
Three key priorities for future neuroeconomic stud-
ies of CD are (a) to investigate systematically decision
making using tasks that allow disaggregation of the
decision-making stages identified in this review –
even though we hypothesize that decision and man-
agement-related processes are essentially intact in
CD, very few studies have examined the intervening
processes between evaluation and outcome apprai-
sal. It will also be critical to study the impact of
alterations in reinforcement processes (e.g. aversive
prediction error signals) on the subsequent evalua-
tion of options and reinforcement learning with both
appetitive and aversive stimuli; (b) to examine deci-
sion making in social contexts, in order to under-
stand how the decision making of individuals with
CD is affected by the presence of peers, and whether
their antisocial behavior is related to stable changes
in social preferences (e.g. reduced inequity aversion
when it concerns others, but heightened sensitivity
to (perceived) unfair treatment by others); (c) to
investigate the impact of environmental adversity
(e.g. being raised in poverty, effects of socioeconomic
status gradients, and biological embedding of early-
life stress) on the preference structures that guide
the evaluation process, given the strong association
between childhood maltreatment, low socioeconomic
status, and CD (Caspi et al., 2002; Piotrowska,
Stride, Croft, & Rowe, 2015).
Depression
Background
Depression is estimated to affect up to 10% of youth
by age 16 (Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, Keeler, &
Angold, 2003). Rates increase during adolescence
(Thapar, Collishaw, Pine, & Thapar, 2012) and from
puberty onwards, and the disorder becomes twice as
common in females compared with males (Lewin-
sohn, Rohde, & Seeley, 1998). Depression is a major
contributor to global disease burden (Collins et al.,
2011). The presence of co-occurring disorders is
high, with anxiety and DBDs being the most com-
mon (e.g. CD; Stringaris, Lewis, & Maughan, 2014).
The pathophysiology of depression involves alter-
ations in medial prefrontal networks (anterior cin-
gulate cortex, ventromedial, and orbitofrontal cortex)
and related subcortical regions (e.g. amygdala and
ventral striatum) which disrupt the processing of,
and regulation of responses to, affective and moti-
vationally salient stimuli and events (Kerestes,
Davey, Stephanou, Whittle, & Harrison, 2014). Evi-
dence-based treatments for depression include cog-
nitive behavioral therapy and medication (Maughan,
Collishaw, & Stringaris, 2013; Thapar et al., 2012).
Core hypotheses relating to impaired decision
making in depression
Alterations in self-referential, executive, and rein-
forcement processes, and their underlying brain
networks, interact to produce disengaged, persever-
ative, and pessimistic decision making.
Evaluation. A dysfunctional attributional style due
to negative perceptual biases of past events is
compounded by default mode network-related exces-
sive self-focusing, which manifests as reluctance to
engage in choice behavior. Anticipation of reward is
diminished (reflected in decreased ventral striatal
activity) which, combined with blunted affective
forecasting, exaggerates negative and underestimate
positive characteristics of future choice options,
contributing to disengaged decisions.
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Decision and management. Excessive negative
rumination on past events reduces the individual’s
willingness not only to initiate but also to execute
future decisions. Failure to suppress default mode
network-mediated negative intrusive thoughts dur-
ing decision management increases choice instabil-
ity and the tendency to ineffectively reevaluate
ongoing decisions.
Appraisal and accommodation. Hypersensitivity
to negative outcomes, reflected by increased ventral
striatal responses to punishment, coupled with
negative appraisal of decisions due to excessive
rumination, further contributes to a pessimistic
decision-making style.
Empirical indications
Models about the influence of emotions on decision-
making stretch back a long time (Loewenstein,
Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Surprisingly, they
have received very little empirical testing in the
context of psychiatric disorders and, specifically, of
depression.
Dysfunctional attributional style. Attributional
style, the way in which a person explains the causes
of positive and/or negative events in their lives,
is often altered in depression. As in adulthood
(Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986), childhood
depression is associated with an internalized
(i.e. self-blaming), stable (i.e. trait like), and global
(i.e. generalizing across situations) attributional
style. Positive events are attributed to external,
unstable, and specific causes (Gladstone & Kaslow,
1995). A task-based fMRI study in adults (Seidel
et al., 2012) assessing attributions to social events
found that the left temporal pole, the left dorsome-
dial, and the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
were significantly more activated in controls versus
depressed patients for ‘non–self-serving’ attributions
and in patients versus controls for ‘self-serving’
attributions. Since, in controls, ‘non–self-serving’
and, in depressed patients, ‘self-serving’ attributions
are in conflict with the prevailing expected style, the
study suggests that higher degree of cognitive control
is required to inhibit the prepotent tendency toward
either self-serving or non–self-serving responses.
Excessive rumination and obsessive self-focus:
Rumination can be a maladaptive thinking style as a
response to negative mood states, including depres-
sion, irritability, and anxiety. It is common in patients
with both anxiety and depressive disorders and may
contribute to impairment over andabove thepresence
of other psychopathology (McLaughlin & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2011). Meta-analytic studies provide
compelling evidence for negative rumination in ado-
lescent depression (Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Schouten, 2009). Ruminative thinking
can lead to interpretation bias so that ambiguous
information is interpreted consistently with the con-
tent of ruminations (Mor, Hertel, Ngo, Shachar, &
Redak, 2014). In dysphoric individuals, rumination
mediates difficulties with making decisions; more-
over, it reduces confidence in decisions (van Randen-
borgh, de Jong-Meyer, & Huffmeier, 2010b).
Rumination can, therefore, bias the evaluation of
prospective situations but also the execution of the
decision and the interpretation of previous events
(appraisal of decisions, see further below). Increased
obsessive self-focused cognition, typically associated
with negatively distorted autobiographical memories,
is common in both adults (for a review, see Ingram,
1990) and in youth with depression. For example,
Black and Possel (2013) found that maladaptive self-
referential processing and excessive rumination at
baseline predicted increased depressive symptoms
6 months later (Black & Possel, 2013). Additionally,
negative memory biases on the self-referent encoding
task at age 6 predicted increased depressive symp-
toms at age 9 (Goldstein, Hayden, & Klein, 2014).
Indeed, compared with healthy controls, individuals
with dysphoria experience their decisions as more
difficult and had less confidence in their choices and
this difficulty wasmediated via excessive self-focused
thinking (van Randenborgh et al., 2010b). The same
is true for depressed individuals (van Randenborgh,
de Jong-Meyer, & Huffmeier, 2010a). Furthermore,
excessive rumination predicts indecision in adults,
and this effect is independent of the severity of
depression (Di Schiena, Luminet, Chang, & Philippot,
2013). A number of studies have found alterations in
functional connectivity in depression as well as in the
interplaybetween thedefaultmodenetworkandother
systems, relating such alterations to excessive self-
referential and rumination processes (Marchetti,
Koster, Sonuga-Barke, &De Raedt, 2012; Pannekoek
et al., 2014). Rumination has been shown to be
correlated with decreased fractional anisotropy (a
proxy of white-matter structural connectivity) in the
superior longitudinal fasciculus, the major tract con-
necting frontal/parietal circuits with the limbic sys-
tem (Zuo et al., 2012). A seminal study (Sheline et al.,
2009) reported increased self-referential processing
related to a failure to deactivate core default mode
regions (including ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
anterior cingulate, lateral parietal cortex, and lateral
temporal cortex) while participants were examining
and reappraising pictures. A recent meta-analysis
found increased connectivity between the default
mode network and subgenual prefrontal cortex, sug-
gesting that coactivation of these regions is related to
behavioral withdrawal and a self-focused, negatively
valenced and withdrawn ruminative state (Hamilton,
Farmer, Fogelman, & Gotlib, 2015).
Affective forecasting. When one envisions the
future, one does not only assess the likelihood of
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future events but also forms projections for how
those events will feel. This is termed affective fore-
cast. Relative to controls, individuals with dysphoria
present with blunted affective forecast, expecting
future positive events to feel less positive even if they
occur (Marroquin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2015). This
might further strengthen the tendency to avoid
future decisions.
Reward hyposensitivity. The reward network is
altered in adolescents with depressive disorder
(Forbes & Dahl, 2012; Kerestes et al., 2014b;
Romens et al., 2015) and also in unaffected first-
degree relatives of patients with depression (Olino
et al., 2014). One of the most prominent findings is
that of reduced anticipation for reward. Recent
neuroimaging results demonstrate that activity in
the ventral striatum is reduced in adolescent partic-
ipants with subthreshold and clinical depression
relative to healthy comparison subjects during
anticipation of monetary rewards (Stringaris et al.,
2015). Moreover, diminished ventral striatal
response to reward anticipation is linked with anhe-
donia, rather than low mood, and predicts new onset
of depression 2 years later. The reduced response to
reward anticipation may underlie a variety of moti-
vational deficits in depression that clinicians tradi-
tionally subsume under the construct of anhedonia.
Importantly, no brain alterations have been found
during positive monetary outcomes in depressed
subjects compared with controls, strengthening the
notion that anticipatory rather than consummatory
processes are aberrant in depression (Treadway &
Zald, 2011). As such, this process may be particu-
larly relevant in the evaluation stage.
Hypersensitivity to negative outcomes. Comple-
menting the hyporesponsivity to positive reward,
depressed patients also show a hypersensitive to
punishment (Kessel, Kujawa, Hajcak, & Klein, 2015)
or negative feedback (Eshel & Roiser, 2010). In a
recent fMRI study, it was shown that that adolescent
with anhedonia, but not thosewith lowmood, showed
increased activation in the ventral striatum during
negative outcome (Stringaris et al., 2015b). This is in
accordance with previous results from adults with
anhedonia (Padrao, Mallorqui, Cucurell, Marco-Pal-
lares, & Rodriguez-Fornells, 2013). Along with the
effect of rumination, hypersensitivity to negative
outcome may bias the appraisal stage, leading to
pessimistic assessment of previous choices.
Summary of depression-related research priorities
The following lines of investigation are particularly
relevant in relation to the hypotheses discussed
above: (a) there is a specific need to investigate the
brain correlates of decision-making processes in
depression from a developmental perspective – to
address the lack of studies in childhood and adoles-
cence.While theneurobiological underpinnings of the
relationshipbetweendepressionanddecisionmaking
are being elucidated in adults, there are several
unexplored key areas in relation to young people’s
decision making. For instance, the neuronal corre-
lates of attributional processes have not been specif-
ically and systematically studied in depressed youth.
(b) The association between laboratory measures of
decision making and more ecologically indices, espe-
cially in relation to the evaluation stage need to be
established. (c) Finally, we need more experimental
studies comparing the effects of cognitive versus
behavioral interventions effects on reward-related
decision processes and their brain correlates.
Anxiety
Background
Anxiety disorders are common in youth with a preva-
lence ranging between 5% and 10% (Pine & Klein,
2010) and are probably best understood as extreme
expressions of continuously distributed traits (Plo-
min, Haworth, & Davis, 2009). Anxiety disorders
include phenomena that occur in early childhood,
such as separation anxiety disorder, and conditions
that mainly emerge from adolescence onwards, such
as social phobia and panic disorder. There is evidence
both for the common etiological underpinnings of
these disorders (Rutter, 2011), as well as for the value
in distinguishing between them (Pine, 2011). The
pathophysiology of anxiety involves alterations in a
conserved ‘threat network’ involving subcortical
structures, such as the amygdala, that are critical
for the acquisition of fear responses (LeDoux, 2000),
and frontal areas involved in emotion regulation
(Stringaris, 2015). Cognitively, anxious people are
more likely to show increased vigilance to threat,
characterized by a negativity bias (Bar-Haim, Lamy,
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzen-
doorn, 2007), which is related to amygdala hyperre-
sponsivity to threat (Monk et al., 2008). Medication
treatment with selective serotonin reuptake inhibi-
tors is effective in reducing anxiety symptoms, and
cognitive behavioral therapy is also effective (James,
James, Cowdrey, Soler, & Choke, 2013).
Core hypotheses relating to impaired decision
making in anxiety
Stress induced by heightened levels of performance
anxiety arising from self-doubt, combined with
hypervigilance for threat, creates a hesitant, risk-
averse, and self-deprecating decision-making style.
Evaluation stage. (a) Amygdala overactivation,
combined with diminished top-down control in exec-
utive circuits (e.g. ventrolateral prefrontal cortex),
underpins automatic attentional bias toward threat
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and leads to the overestimation of negative charac-
teristics of neutral outcomes, especially where those
outcomes are ambiguous or uncertain; this in turn
leads to excessive risk aversion. (b) Reduced reward
valuation during episodes of stress-induced-perfor-
mance anxiety diminishes expected subjective value
estimates and decision-making confidence and is
reflected in lower activity in the ventral striatum and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
Decision and management. Dissociation between
ventral and dorsal frontal regions gives rise to con-
flicting positive evaluations alongside anxiety when
subjects are faced with ambiguous choices (i.e. when
competing outcomes are close in subjective value).
Appraisal and accommodation. Anxious self-refer-
ential thoughts about performance, reflected in
increased default mode activity during task execu-
tion, lead to the devaluation of achieved outcomes –
shifting attention away from the present situation
toward past or future negative events (compulsive
prospection). This leads to impairments in the indi-
vidual’s ability to predict outcomes.
Empirical indications
Attention to threat. Information processing in peo-
ple with anxiety is biased toward the negative. Anx-
ious children selectively attend to negative
information, are distracted by it, and find it difficult
to disengage from it (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). They
aremore likely to interpret ambiguous information as
threatening, in ways that cut across different anxiety
disorders and are similar in adults and children (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007), although a reversal of this effect
(with bias away from the negative) has been found
when individuals are under significant threat (Bar-
Haim et al., 2010). Biases exist for both consciously
processed and subliminally presented stimuli. Two
stages of biased information processing in anxiety
have been identified – an early, fast and automatic or
amygdala-based primary pathway and a secondary,
slower system that incorporates contextual informa-
tion relying on prefrontal processing (Beck & Clark,
1997; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).
Young people with generalized anxiety disorder show
excess amygdala activity when briefly presented with
angry faces (Monk et al., 2008).
Executive control. Anxiety is associated with a
reduced ability to recruit executive processes to
moderate emotional responses through mechanisms
such as attention reallocation or reinterpretation
(Pine, 2007; Posne & Rothbart, 2000). From a neural
perspective, such regulation happens through cross-
talk between the amygdala and parts of the pre-
frontal and orbitofrontal cortex: regions are active
during emotion regulation such as when appraising
emotionally laden situation (Ochsner, Silvers, &
Buhle, 2012). It has been demonstrated that
increased activity in prefrontal and orbitofrontal
areas correlates with reductions in amygdala activity
(Banks, Eddy, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2007;
Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008). In this
regard, there is fMRI evidence to support the theory
of Eysenck et al. (2007) that anxiety disrupts exec-
utive processes, such as inhibition, thus impairing
an individual’s attentional control over the process-
ing of emotionally salient stimuli. In a study by Monk
et al. (2008), hyperactivation in the amygdala shows
negative connectivity between this region and the
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex suggesting a
decreased top-down control of automatic processes.
Moreover, reduced DLPFC activations is present in
patients with anxiety but not healthy volunteers
during error processing (Fitzgerald et al., 2013).
Reward processing and learning. Neuropsycho-
logical experiments suggest that anxiety-related
threat perception may bias individuals toward over-
estimating potential losses (Clark et al., 2012). The
presence of anxiety also appears to diminish the
expected positive value of outcomes. In healthy
volunteers, anxiety is associated with reduced activ-
ity in the medial prefrontal cortex following feedback
related to both monetary gains and monetary losses
(Treadway, Buckholtz, & Zald, 2013). Indeed, antic-
ipatory anxiety diminishes activity in the ventral
striatum and medial prefrontal cortex during when
these were asked to estimate the subjective value of
events and predict outcomes (Engelmann, Meyer,
Fehr, & Ruff, 2015). Consistent with animal models
of stress activity in the anterior insula, an area
known to preferentially encode negative value was
increased and the connectivity between medial pre-
frontal cortex and striatum was diminished during
anticipatory stress (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). How
these findings about incidental anxiety apply to
those with persistent anxiety, typical of most anxiety
disorders, remain understudied. Recent results
suggest that social reward responsivity to reward
valuation in patients with social anxiety disorder
may be reduced as reflected by diminished activity in
putamen and reduced ventral striatal-anterior cin-
gulate cortex connectivity (Cremers, Veer, Spin-
hoven, Rombouts, & Roelofs, 2014). However, these
effects may be specific to social reward cues and not
apply to monetary rewards (Maresh, Allen, & Coan,
2014). Contingency learning in anxiety has received
little attention from researchers. There is some
evidence that high-trait anxious individuals show
deficits in the ability to adapt their decisions in the
face of aversive stimuli especially when environ-
ments became volatile (Browning, Behrens, Jocham,
O’Reilly, & Bishop, 2015). This deficit could result in
anxious people perceiving aversive events to be less
predictable and thus harder to avoid. Future exper-
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iments need to test whether other emotional disor-
ders, such as depression, suffer from similar prob-
lems.
Avoidance. While procrastination is not cotermi-
nus with anxiety, both appear related to the avoid-
ance of stressful situations. Hence, anxious behavior
is characterized – indeed for some disorders defined
by – the avoidance of certain decisions or tasks
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). It appears
that the degree of approach or withdrawal from a
situation depends on activity in the prefrontal-
striatal-insular network. Increased prefrontal activ-
ity seems to be associated to less approach behavior
(Aupperle, Melrose, Francisco, Paulus, & Stein,
2015). Avoidance of decision making may even be
present for anxious individuals in so called win–
win situations. It appears that dorsal prefrontal
areas are associated with anxiety to choice conflict
between positive outcomes and predicts the reversal
of a previously made choice when given the chance of
reevaluation. The extent to which there are interindi-
vidual differences in such processing of conflictual
decisions and whether these correlate with trait
anxiety remains to be established. Related to avoid-
ance behaviors are the increased levels of intolerance
to uncertainty found in anxious individuals (Beesdo-
Baum et al., 2012), which leads to negatively biased
interpretations of events. Intolerance of uncertainty
is linked with anger expression in individuals with
generalized anxiety disorder and may explain why
they may disengage from tasks or avoid decision
making (Fracalanza, Koerner, Deschenes, & Dugas,
2014). It appears that intolerance to uncertainty is
positively correlated with activity in frontolimbic
areas, particularly in subgroups of people with social
or generalized anxiety (Krain et al., 2008).
Summary of anxiety-related research priorities
Recent advances in anxiety neuroscience and treat-
ment open up a number of exciting avenues for
further research in decision making as discussed
above: (a) How person–environment interactions
influence decision-making habits. Anxious with-
drawal or irritability (Krebs et al., 2013; Mikita et al.,
2015; Stoddard et al., 2014) is all potent modifiers of
parental or peer responses to a child and will serve to
reinforce existing decision making. The extent to
which environmental modifications – as is, for exam-
ple, done with standard behavioral treatment – will
have an effect on the entrenched and more general
decision-making style of an anxious person has been
surprisingly underexplored. (b) Attention Bias Mod-
ification Treatment (ABMT) targets a decision-mak-
ing processing in anxiety – what are its underlying
neural correlates and can we use these as a guide on
how to target other decision-making processes in
anxiety (such as reward processing and learning)?
Conclusions and issues for further
consideration
Children with mental health problems continually
have to make decisions, yet we lack a comprehensive
account of the factors and processes that may
underlie decision-making impairments in mental
disorders. Important functional outcomes, including
whether they can return to school, or even whether
they choose to stay alive, rely on their ability to make
decisions effectively. Similarly, psychological distur-
bances may constrain a person’s capacity for deci-
sion making and impair their volition or sense of
agency. While this is widely recognized in legal
systems around the world, a differentiated under-
standing of the pathways leading to these impair-
ments in different disorders is still lacking. In this
article, we have attempted to provide an integrative,
transdiagnostic neuroeconomic framework for the
study of impaired decision making in psychopathol-
ogy and apply it to highlight putative differences in
decision making between ADHD, CD, depression,
and anxiety. We argue that describing how these
disorders map onto difficulties in the evaluation,
execution, and/or appraisal of decisions is a key
first step toward understanding why psychopathol-
ogy frequently leads to negative outcomes. In this
review, we have identified impairments that we
predict are unique to each of the psychiatric disor-
ders. While the focus has been on the distinct
features of disorders, we acknowledge that there
will also be problems cutting across current diag-
nostic boundaries. We have also considered the
neuropsychological mechanisms that may underlie
such difficulties in decision making. In general
terms, there is at present only limited or indirect
evidence to support these disorder-specific hypothe-
ses, and relevant evidence from children and ado-
lescents is particularly scarce. Most evidence
relating to decision making in childhood psy-
chopathology comes from studies of ADHD and
CD, but even here we currently lack the necessary
integration across levels of analysis to establish the
role of specific neurocognitive systems in driving
decision-making deficits. One consequence of this is
that we have had to resort to adult studies when
highlighting relevant evidence. We hope that this
review will spur the field on to perform more
neuroeconomically inspired studies of decision mak-
ing in children with mental disorders.
Although we have addressed a wide range of
issues, a number of additional issues require con-
sideration in any discussion of decision making in
child and adolescent mental disorders.
Causality
What is the role of impaired decision making in the
causal pathways from etiological factors to mental
disorders? Decision making might be viewed as an
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expression of a disordered state – an extension of the
clinical profile and a manifestation of its presenta-
tion – perhaps mediating the pathway from disorder
to functional impairment and reduced quality of life.
At the same time, the neuroeconomic model provides
an alternative perspective on the pathophysiological
pathways to disorder expression – where dysfunc-
tional decision making associated with mental dis-
orders appears to be a downstream effect of neural
and cognitive mechanisms. For example, an overac-
tive limbic system may bias attention toward nega-
tive stimuli, and this may in turn adversely affect the
evaluation stage of decision making. Treatments
such as attentional bias modification aim to reduce
attentional biases toward negative stimuli and may
thus improve decision making and reduce impair-
ment. However, it is also possible that dysfunctional
decision making is a causal mechanism in its own
right, contributing to a vicious cycle and compound-
ing the effects of the disorder itself. This could
happen in number of ways. The decisions one
makes constrain their experiences. If one chooses
immediacy over delayed rewards, or safety over risk,
then one reduces exposure to delay and risk and
diminishes one’s opportunities to learn how to
manage delay and/or risk in the future. The same
applies to escape from threat in anxious individuals.
Decisions can also negatively impact a person’s
mood – that is negative predictions about the future
through the process of affective forecasting can
induce further hopelessness and despair in already
depressed individuals. Conversely, the negative
appraisal of previous decisions can impact not only
on future decision making but also exacerbate
negative moods and low self-esteem. To the extent
that this is true, targeting the underlying decision-
making processes may offer potential in alleviating
the primary symptoms of disorders as well as
associated impairment.
Complexity, comorbidity, and heterogeneity
As mentioned in the introduction, the RDoC initia-
tive is promoting a (reductionist) model of clinical
scientific enquiry, which attempts to break mental
disorders into their basic neurobiological constituent
components or core impairment dimensions to
provide an empirically driven transdiagnostic alter-
native to current clinically informed diagnostic mod-
els (Insel et al., 2010). The hope is that such an
approach will progress translational science by
aligning diagnostic approaches more directly to
neurobiological treatment targets. In describing the
complex and dynamic nature of the underlying
pathophysiology of decision making in mental dis-
orders and highlighting the ways in which basic
alterations within brain systems can manifest in very
different ways in different disorders, the current
review highlights both of the challenges faced by
researchers working within the RDoC framework.
More specifically, it may only be when the dynamic
interactions between brain systems or core neu-
rocognitive processes are fully considered that the
particular features of the psychopathological disor-
der become apparent – if this were the case, then the
optimism surrounding the RDoC initiative may be
misplaced. In fact, we acknowledge that the current
neuroeconomic framework underestimates the
degree of complexity of the determinants of decision
making in mental disorders.
In particular, given limitations on space, two key
elements contributing to such complexity have been
deliberately omitted from this review. First, there is
the critical issue of overlap between disorders. As a
first step, we have contrasted the disorders in their
archetypal and generic forms. However, we acknowl-
edge that there is substantial overlap between the
four disorders and comorbidity with other disorders
(e.g. ASD) is substantial. This highlights several key
questions for further consideration. For instance, if
two disorders co-occur, do their decision making
attributes combine in an additive way and com-
pound the level of impairment or does the presence
of a second disorder transform the decision-making
style associated with the first? For instance, what
would the combination of reckless and hesitant
decision making look like in the case of the child
with CD and anxiety (a far from uncommon presen-
tation)? We have highlighted how little research
directly addresses the interaction between different
brain systems in decision making. However, there is
even less evidence relating to comorbid presenta-
tions of disorders, although some components of our
model have been investigated (i.e. executive func-
tions in comorbid internalizing and externalizing
conditions; Woltering, Lishak, Hodgson, Granic, &
Zelazo, 2015). Important targets for future research
are the differential characterization of introspective
rumination in anxiety versus depression and how
these combine in the children with both conditions.
Further complexity stems from heterogeneity within
disorders. Although earlier models have tried to map
specific mental disorders onto their underlying
neural substrates, it is becoming increasingly clear
that psychiatric disorders are pathophysiologically
heterogeneous – with different individuals with the
same disorder (or at least meeting the same diag-
nostic criteria) showing markedly different neu-
ropsychological profiles. This has been perhaps
most fully explored in relation to ADHD (Sjowall,
Roth, Lindqvist, & Thorell, 2013), where there has
been a proposal for neuropsychological subtypes
(Faraone et al., 2015; Nigg, Willcutt, Doyle, &
Sonuga-Barke, 2005). Heterogeneity is also consid-
ered an important issue in CD, anxiety, and depres-
sion. Accordingly, it is possible that certain
subgroups within each disorder could be defined
on the basis of decision-making profiles, with some
patients displaying certain impairments and others
showing distinct profiles.
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Development
We have not had the space to adequately consider
developmental issues. Furthermore, the limitations
inherent in the present review should be acknowl-
edged in this regard especially in relation to (a) the
scarcity of child and adolescent data relating to a
substantial proportion of our core hypotheses –
especially for anxiety and depression; and (b) the
almost complete absence of longitudinal data which
would allow consideration of the developmental
progression over time of decision-making pheno-
types and the underlying neurodevelopmental pro-
cesses that drive changes. In thinking through
developmental considerations in the future, we need
to reflect on the differences between the four condi-
tions considered here in terms of clinical and devel-
opmental profiles and timings (prodromal states,
initial onset and progression, and transitions to
adult life). The potential roles of neurodevelopmental
immaturity and maturational delay will need to be
carefully considered as contributing factors, at least
in the cases of ADHD and CD (Shaw et al., 2007).
Developmental models not only highlight the impor-
tance of characterizing developmental phenotypes of
decision-making across childhood and adolescence
(i.e. how decision-making profiles change with age)
but also the role of the neurodevelopmental pro-
cesses that shape those phenotypes. In particular,
this article has concentrated on the neurobiological
substrates of suboptimal decision making in mental
disorders. A developmental psychopathology per-
spective forces us to consider the potential role of
the social environment in shaping decision-making
biases or deficits.
Social aspects of decision making
We have also not discussed other social considera-
tions – such as the influence of social and peer
processes on decision making (Smith, Chein, &
Steinberg, 2014), decisions about how to treat others
(e.g.whether tobehave fairly orunfairly toward them),
and the computations required to make sense of
others’ behavior (e.g. Behrens, Hunt, & Rushworth,
2009). These issues are undoubtedly important in
understanding psychopathology. For example, ado-
lescents with anxiety may be overly sensitive to social
evaluation and may make suboptimal choices in an
effort to conform to perceived social norms, whereas
thosewithCDmaybe relatively insensitive to negative
social evaluation. Initial studies suggest that adults
with depression show atypical behavior in interper-
sonal economic exchange paradigms (Pulcu et al.,
2015; Shao, Zhang, & Lee, 2015), and such tasks
have shed light on abnormal social behavior in
personality disorders (King-Casas et al., 2008; Koe-
nigs, Kruepke, & Newman, 2010). However, for rea-
sons of space, and because there is comparatively
little evidence available fromstudies of developmental
populations, we felt that this topic should be reserved
for a future review.
Clinical implications
While it would be premature to speculate about
detailed disorder-specific clinical implications of the
current review, in more general terms, a considera-
tion of decision making raises the following clinical
questions: First, would measuring decision-making
problems and related neuroeconomic parameters
enhance clinicians’ ability to predict a patient’s
overall impairment? Second, would targeting deci-
sion-making pathology make sense in developing
future treatments? As mentioned already, ABMT can
be construed as such an attempt and has had
variable success (Cristea, Mogoase, David, & Cui-
jpers, 2015). This question may be particularly
relevant for treatments that are thought to affect
reward processes, for example, behavioral activation
in depression. Could these be usefully modified so
that disturbances in decision making, rather than
clinical symptoms, become the prime target? Finally,
decision-making pathology will be of particular
interest to those clinicians who regularly assess
their patients’ capacity – a particularly underdevel-
oped field in child and adolescent psychiatry. Could
decision-making science provide a firmer ground for
such assessments or at least be used as an addi-
tional resource?
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Key points
• Success or failure in life is partly determined by the decisions one makes.
• Clinically, it is apparent that impaired decision-making impacts daily functioning in young people with mental
health conditions.
• To understand relationships between decision making and specific conditions, we first need to acknowledge
the neuropsychological complexity of the decision-making process – involving as it does multiple stages and
neurocognitive systems.
• We propose that decision making is impaired in distinct ways in different psychopathological conditions – each
reflecting a specific neurocognitive profile.
• We hypothesize that decision making is inefficient, impulsive, and inconsistent in ADHD; reckless and
insensitive to negative outcomes in CD; disengaged/perseverative/pessimistic in depression; hesitant/risk-
aversive/self-deprecating in anxiety.
• Evidence from research within a developmental psychopathology framework, across multiple levels of analysis,
is required to test these hypotheses.
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